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I. INTRODUCTION
Given the plethora of land use regulations at the state and local level
in Hawai'i,' the relative dearth of land use cases reaching the appellate
courts of Hawai'i is still something of an anomaly.2 This was true in
the Richardson yearss and it is true for the Lum Court as well. This
makes trend analysis a risky business.
Nevertheless, there are a few discernible case lines,4 short though
they may be. These include (1) the relationship between county plans,
and to some extent state plans, and zoning regulations;5 (2) the role
For analysis and discussion of Hawaii's complex land use regulatory system at
the state and county levels see FRED P. BOSSELMAN & DAVID L. CALLIES, THE QUIET
REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROLS ch. 1 (1971); DAVID L. CALLIES, REGULATING
PARADISE: LAND USE CONTROLS IN HAWAII (1984); DANIEL L. MANDELKER, ENVIRON-
MENTAL AND LAND USE CONTROLS LEGISLATION ch. 7 (1976); PHYLLIS MYERS, ZONING
HAWAII (1977).
2 Such cases do not often reach the United States Supreme Court either, but the
Court's 1991-92 term promises to be a watershed one. In three cases, the Court will
address and in all likelihood substantially rewrite the law on taking of property by
regulation, which will vitally affect the application of land use law in Hawai'i.
In Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991), the Court will
address whether a state coastal protection statute forbidding construction on two beach
front residential lots is a taking of private property through regulation. In PFZ
Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28 (1990), the Court will address the
application of constitutional due process to alleged defects in Puerto Rico's land use
permitting process. Finally, in Yee v. Escondido, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1990), the
Court will deal with the application of the Fifth Amendment to rent control in the
context of a mobile home park.
Coupled with the Court's 1987 trilogy (Keystone Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (deciding takings); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (requiring compensation for regulatory takings); and
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (requiring an "essential nexus"
between land use permit conditions and the proposed land development)), the Court
may very well be finally disposing of land use and the Constitution, at least for the
balance of this century.
I William S. Richardson was Chief Justice of the Hawaii Supreme Court from
1966 to 1982.
1 Some of the case lines continue the court's interests from the Richardson years.
To that end, Richardson Court cases are included in this survey, primarily in the
footnotes, for comparison.
I See infra part II.
University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 14:119
of initiative and referendum in land use regulation; 6 (3) the role of
coastal zone management protection law;7 (4) standing; 8 (5) the pre-
sumption of validity afforded administrative agency decisions; 9 and (6)
the role of and standard of review applicable to the zoning board of
appeals.'o
The court has also addressed the applicability of zoning regulations
to religious buildings in the face of First Amendment challenges. 1'
More tangentially, from a land use perspective, the court has suggested
that the police power is not coterminous with eminent domain in the
public purpose area, at least under Hawai'i's land reform act, 2 in
welcome contrast to the United States Supreme Court. 3
This survey also incorporates decisions from the Hawaii Intermediate
Court of Appeals (I.C.A.). Hawaii Revised Statutes section 602-57 gives
the I.C.A. concurrent jurisdiction with the Hawaii Supreme Court to
hear all matters. 14 The Lum Court's policy of assigning cases focuses
more on an even distribution of the caseload between the supreme
court and I.C.A. than on a separation of cases by the issues they
present. The rationale behind this division is that strict adherence to
the assignment criteria as set forth in Hawaii Revised Statutes section
602-6 would place an unmanageable burden on the I.C.A., resulting
in a backlog."5 In order to avoid this overload, the supreme court does
6 See infa part III.
I See infa part IV.
8 See infa part V.
9 See infra part VI.
10 See infra part VII.
1 See infra part VIII.A.
12 See infa part VIII.B.
13 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
' HAw. REV. STAT. § 602-57 (1985).
15 Interview with Chief Justice Lum by Jon C. Yoshimura, in Honolulu, Haw.
(Sept. 24, 1991).
[O]ur number of appeals has gone to about 800 a year. And that's just appeals.
Now, if we were to follow the guidelines, I would say that maybe only about
100 to 150 cases would come to us, the rest would go to the I.C.A. and
obviously the cases would bog down at the I.C.A. And so I think that as a
practical matter, because there are eight of us really, we try to allocate about
100 cases per judge. Roughly, we keep about 500 cases, about 300 cases to the
I.C.A. Now, we're trying to get more I.C.A. judges so that we can really
handle what is truly the kind of cases the supreme court should be handling.
But we have been turned down by the legislature. And for that reason we will
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not assign all the cases which the I.C.A. might normally be expected
to hear. 16
II. PLANNING AND ZONING: THE CONFORMITY REQUIREMENT
The most significant land use law and policy contribution of the
Lum Court is its ringing defense of the land use plan as the basis for
land use controls in Lum Yip Kee, Ltd. v. City & County of Honolulu17
and Kaiser Hawaii Kai Development Co. v. City & County of Honolulu18
(commonly referred to as "Sandy Beach"). There can be no question
after these two decisions that land use plans are paramount in the land
use regulatory scheme in Hawai'i-and particularly in the City and
County of Honolulu. Furthermore, the cases make clear that in the
event of conflict with zoning ordinances or land use initiatives, it is
the plan which will control. Hawai'i thus retains its position among
states in the forefront of the requirement that zoning must conform to
and be based upon comprehensive planning. 19 Of the two cases, the
most fulsome and important is Lum Yip Kee.
In Lum Yip Kee,20 the court had before it a land use initiative of the
type that it later condemned on land use planning grounds in Sandy
continue with the same policy .... Generally that's the sort of policy I adopted
when I was assignment justice, and I think Justice Padgett has likewise continued
to do that.
Id.; see Jon C. Yoshimura, Administering Justice or just Administration: The Hawaii Supreme
Court and The Intermediate Court of Appeals, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 271 (1992).
,6 See interview with Chief Justice Lum, supra note 15.
Justice Moon was recently appointed assignment justice in place of Justice Padgett.
This may impact the policy of distribution observed in the court thus far because
Justice Moon favors stricter compliance with HAW. REV. STAT. 5 602-6. Interview
with Justice Moon by Jon C. Yoshimura, in Honolulu, Haw. (Oct. 1, 1991).
" 70 Haw. 179, 767 P.2d 815 (1989) (Lum, C.J.).
,8 70 Haw. 480, 777 P.2d 244 (1989) (Wakatsuki, J.) [hereinafter Sandy Beach].
'9 Other jurisdictions in which "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" is more
than lip service with respect to the relationship of planning to zoning are California,
Washington and Florida. For examples of statutes and cases see DAVID L. CALLIES &
ROBERT H. FREILICH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE chs. 3, 9 (1986).
20 70 Haw. 179, 767 P.2d 815 (1989) (Lum, CJ). In Lum Yip Kee, the landowner
challenged two ordinances which changed the land use designation of his property
from "high density apartment" to "low density apartment". The dispute spanned
three annual development plan reviews by the Honolulu City Council in which the
property was reclassified from high density apartment use to medium density and then
back to high density. Frustrated with the City Council's indecisiveness, the voters of
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Beach, but which it failed to resolve because the City Council passed
an ordinance virtually identical to the initiative, 2' rendering the pro-
priety of the initiative issue moot.22
However, in the course of a lengthy opinion, Chief Justice Lum
made it crystal clear that land use controls in Hawai'i are founded
absolutely on the planning process,2 3 a sentiment echoed by Justice
Wakatsuki writing for the majority in Sandy Beach the following year. 24
The court commenced its discussion with the general principle that
the "actual physical development of a site is controlled by the devel-
opment plan of the area in which the site is located." 25 The court had
previously noted that in Honolulu land use controls are implemented
through a "three-tier regime" consisting of the island-wide general
plan; the eight regional development plans; and zoning and subdivision
the City and County of Honolulu turned to the initiative process and adopted an
ordinance in November of 1984. Finally, in May of 1985, the City Council adopted
a similar ordinance designating the property as low density apartment use. Id. at 184-
85, 767 P.2d at 819.
21 Id. at 185, 767 P.2d at 819. The redesignation from high density to low density
was part of the overall Development Plan Amendment Ordinance, No. 85-46. Id.
22 Id. at 181, 767 P.2d at 817. The property owner in Lum Yip Kee also claimed
the City Council's reclassification of its fairly large parcel from high to low density
apartment use on the applicable development plan map constituted spot zoning. Id.
at 190, 767 P.2d at 822. Spot zoning is universally condemned as the zoning of a
usually small parcel in a manner wildly inconsistent with surrounding zones and uses
without a rational basis. CALLIES & FREILICH, supra note 19, at 95-97; DANIEL L.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW S 6.24 (1988). The court noted that it had defined spot
zoning as an arbitrary zoning action applied to a small area within a larger area,
different from and inconsistent with the surrounding classifications and not in accor-
dance with a comprehensive plan. 70 Haw. at 190, 767 P.2d at 822 (citing Life of
the Land v. City Council, 61 Haw. 390, 429, 606 P.2d 866, 890 (1980) (Marumoto,
J.)). The court concluded that there had been no spot zoning here, finding that the
council's action was not arbitrary, but based upon sound planning principles. More-
over, the area surrounding the Lum Yip Kee parcel was not inconsistent with low
density apartment use. Finally, the court noted that since some of the plans applicable
to the parcel had as objectives the provision of affordable housing, there was a
reasonable basis for the reclassification. Id. at 191-92, 767 P.2d at 823.
2" Sandy Beach Defense Fund v. City Council, 70 Haw. 361, 773 P.2d 250 (1989)
(Lum, C.J.).
24 Kaiser Hawaii Kai Dev. Co. v. City & County of Honolulu, 70 Haw. 480, 777
P.2d 244 (1989) (Wakatsuki, J.).
25 Lum Yip Kee, 70 Haw. at 182, 767 P.2d at 817 (citing Protect Ala Wai Skyline
v. Land Use & Controls Comm., 6 Haw. App. 540, 548, 735 P.2d 950, 955 (1987)
(Heen, J.) (citing CALLIES, supra note 1, at ch. 3, and 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §§ 1.72, 1.75 (1971))).
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laws, rules, and regulations. It is the development plan land use map
which is a part of each of the eight development plans that "indicates
the location of various land uses such as residential, recreation and
parks, agriculture, commercial, military, and preservation. "26 The
Public Facilities Map shows existing and future location of roads and
streets, sewer lines and other proposed facilities.
27
The court first summarized the various requirements for annual
review and amendment of development plans pursuant to the City
Charter. 8 It observed that "[t]he Charter requires zoning ordinances
to conform to and implement the development plan for that area ...
In order to meet this conformance requirement, it is frequently nec-
essary for a landowner first to seek a development plan amendment
from the City before requesting a zoning change. ' ' 29
Since the plaintiffs in Lum Yip Kee attacked not only the development
plan amendment and conformance to zoning in the County's procedures
but also its conformance to state planning requirements applicable to
counties, 0 the court then proceeded to review those requirements as
well. First, it noted that state statutes require that "county development
plans shall be formulated with input from state and county agencies
as well as the general public.'"'" Furthermore, observed the court,
"The formulation, amendment, and implementation of county general
plans or development plans shall take into consideration statewide
objectives, policies and programs stipulated in state functional plans
approved in consonance with this chapter." 32 However, the court
further observed that "[t]he state functional plans are broad policy
26 Id. at 182, 767 P.2d at 817.
27 Id. at 182, 767 P.2d at 818.
28 Id. at 183, 767 P.2d at 818.
Id. (citing CALLIES, supra note 1, at 27). Unfortunately, the court also blithely
accepted a previous-and pre-development-plan "recognition" that not only enact-
ments but also amendments to development plans constitute legislative acts of the
Council (see Kailua Community Council v. City & County of Honolulu, 60 Haw.
428, 432, 591 P.2d 602, 605 (1979) (Menor, J.)), thus raising a presumption that
map amendments to the development plans may also be legislative acts. Id. at 187,
767 P.2d at 820. This has a variety of ramifications, not the least of which is to make
them subject to initiative and referendum should Hawai'i, through appropriate legis-
lation, choose to reinstate these popular techniques held illegal in Sandy Beach, discussed
infra part III.
Id. at 186, 767 P.2d at 820.
Id. at 188, 767 P.2d at 821 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 226-61(a) (1985)).
32 Id.
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guidelines providing a framework for state and county planning and
do not constitute legal mandates, nor legal standards of performance." 3
This is significantly different from the way the state functional plans
were to interact with county plans originally, 34 but at the very least
the counties must make some attempt to "consider" state policies in
formulating their plans, 3 which in turn control their zoning and
subdivision laws.3 6
Noting that the action of the City Council in amending the applicable
development plan furthered at least two articulated policies of the State
Housing Functional Plan,37 the court also observed that "studies were
made, public hearings held, field investigations were conducted, public
testimony was considered, and findings were made.' '38 Therefore, the
court concluded that the City and County had acted in accordance
with state functional plan requirements as well as its own general and
development plan requirements in amending its development plan.39
In a critical footnote, it also observed that although the challenge was
only to the development plan amendment and that is all the City had
so far done, "[tlhe zoning issue is necessarily moot, however, because
zoning is required to conform to the development plan. . .. Thus, it
would not be possible to rezone [the subject property for high density
use] after the development plan had been amended to 'Low Density
Apartment.' Such a rezoning would be void." °
33 Id.
31 Id. The difference is due to a change in the language of the statute. As the court
noted: "The Hawaii Legislature made this [difference in interaction with the county
plans] clear in 1984, when it amended the State Planning Act to eliminate the
requirements of conformance by the counties with the Act. [HAW. REV. STAT.] S 226-
61(a) was amended so that the counties would only have to 'consider' the functional
plans." See H.R. CONF. COMM. REP. No. 35-84, 12th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (1984),
reprinted in 1984 HAW. H.R. J. 732-33.
31 Lum Yip Kee, 70 Haw. at 188, 767 P.2d at 821.
36 Id. at 183, 767 P.2d at 818.
3" Id. at 189, 767 P.2d at 821. Act 100, the State Plan (codified at HAW. REV.
STAT. § 226), calls for 12 so-called functional plans to be formulated by state agencies
and approved by the legislature, for agriculture, housing, tourism, transportation,
conservation lands, education, higher education, energy, health, recreation, historic
preservation, and water resource development. Id.
Id. at 189, 767 P.2d at 821.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 192 n.15, 767 P.2d at 823 n.15. In this assertion, the court is not quite
correct, strictly speaking. The County Charter specifically requires that no zoning or
subdivision ordinance may be "initiated or adopted unless it conforms to and imple-
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These views of the Lum Court on the importance of the plan
foreshadowed its decision in Sandy Beach, 41 in which it reiterated the
tight fit between land use controls and planning. Suffice it here to
observe that, in that case, the court said, "Zoning by initiative is
inconsistent with the goal of long range comprehensive planning ' 42
and cited with approval those cases which have so held from other
states. The court then reiterated its view of the legislature's "concern
for comprehensive long range planning" 43 by its enactment of the State
Plan 4 setting out county planning requirements and their relationship
to state plans, all, as the court here observed, as set out in the Lum
Yip Kee case. 4
In sum, the place of planning in the land development and regulation
process in Hawai'i is clearly recognized in all its sophistication and
detail by Hawaii's Supreme Court. While hardly a departure from
previous decisions, the court had not previously dealt, approvingly or
otherwise, with planning and land use in such comprehensive detail.
The full ramifications of this clearly plan-based land regulatory system
will in all probability take years of judicial decision-making to clarify.
The court's treatment of initiative and referendum is consequently no
surprise.
III. INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND LAND USE PLANNING IN HAWAI'I
How to deal with the use of initiative and referendum as applied to
land use decision making is a subject which has bedeviled land use
ments the development plan for that area." HONOLULU, HAW., REV. ORDINANCES 5
5-412(3) (1984). It is therefore possible for a landowner to proceed under a zoning
classification which existed prior to the passage of a development plan or amendment
thereto without violating that charter requirement. Hawai'i courts have not yet decided,
as have the courts in at least one state with similar conformance requirements, see,
e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs of Washington County, 507 P.2d 23 (Wash.
1973), that the county is under a duty to conform its zoning map with its development
plan map and that until that is done, the development plan map controls. It is however,
still possible to read earlier statements of the court in this case, as favoring such an
interpretation. See infira notes 25-36 and accompanying text. However, because the
City Council almost inevitably does so conform its zoning map to the relevant
development plan map, this legal "gap" may have little real significance.
See infira part III.
42 Kaiser Hawaii Kai Dev. Co. v. City & County of Honolulu, 70 Haw. 480, 484,
777 P.2d 244, 247 (1989) (Wakatsuki, J.).
41 Id. at 486 n.2, 777 P.2d at 248 n.2.
- HAW. REV. STAT. S 226 (1985).
41 Sandy Beach, 70 Haw. at 486-87, 777 P.2d at 248.
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commentators for many years." There are several theories upon which
cases dealing with the subject turn,47 among which is the effect of ballot
box zoning on comprehensive planning.
The issue of ballot box zoning has come before the Hawaii Supreme
Court three times. In the first case, County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard
Life Insurance Co. 4 (commonly referred to as "Nukoli'i"), the Richardson
Court rejected a developer's claim of estoppel while appearing to
approve of referendum as a means of downzoning parcels of land.
Pursuant to the county charter,49 Kauai voters passed a referendum
measure which repealed a Kauai County Council map amendment to
the Comprehensive Zoning Code permitting resort development at
Nukoli'i Beach.50 After the referendum petition had been certified by
the county clerk, 51 the Planning Commission approved a Special Man-
agement Area (SMA) use permit for the project. The developer pro-
ceeded with expenditures on the project even though the referendum
vote was pending.5 2 Then at the general election the voters voted to
repeal the zoning code amendment .
3
In its analysis, the court rejected the developer's argument that the
County should be estopped from prohibiting the project from contin-
See, e.g., David L. Callies, Nancy C. Neuffer & Carlito P. Caliboso, Ballot Box
Zoning: Initiative, Referendum, and the Law, 39 J. Ust. AND CONTEMP. L. 53 (1991);
Robert H. Freilich & Derek B. Guemmer, Removing Artificial Barriers to Public Participation
in Land Use Policy: Effective Zoning and Planning by Initiative and Referendum, 21 UIB.
LAW. 511 (1989); Jon E. Goetz, Direct Democracy in Land Use Planning: The State Response
to Eastlake, 19 PAC. L. J. 793 (1987); Ronald H. Rosenberg, Referendum Zoning: Legal
Doctrine and Practice, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 381 (1984).
4' E.g., whether the rezoning act is legislative (referendable) or quasijudicial (non-
referendable), whether federal or state due process requirements are met, whether the
power is reserved to the people in the state constitution, and whether direct democracy
is discriminatory. Callies, Neuffer & Caliboso, supra note 46.
65 Haw. 318, 653 P.2d 766 (1982) (Richardson, C.J.) [hereinafter Nukoli'i],
appeal dismissed, Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Committee to Save Nukolii, 460
U.S. 1077 (1983). For full discussion of this case and its aftermath, see Benjamin A.
Kudo, Nukolii: Private Development Rights and the Public Interest, 16 UitB. LAW. 279 (1984);
CALLIES, supra note 1, at 168-69.
'9 KAUAI, HAW., CHARTER art. XXII (1986). In the Nukoli'i opinion, the court
cited to art. V of the Kauai County Charter. However, art. XXII addresses initiative
and referendum.
Nukoli'i, 65 Haw. at 322, 653 P.2d at 771.
Id. at 321, 653 P.2d at 770.
12 Id. at 333-34, 653 P.2d at 777.
11 Id. at 322, 653 P.2d at 771.
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uing.54 The court first stated that there could be no claim of estoppel
until there was reliance on a final discretionary action. 55 In this case
the final discretionary action on which the developer could rely was
the referendum because it had been certified prior to the final discre-
tionary action under the permit process-the issuing of the SMA use
permit.16 The court therefore rejected the developer's estoppel claim;
the developer had proceeded with development prior to the referendum
vote at the risk of the zoning ordinance being repealed and at the risk
of loss of its investment up to that point."
Despite the lengthy discussion on estoppel, the court did not address
the validity of referendum in the planning and zoning process. Nukoli'i
appears to assume that referenda are appropriate means of effecting
zoning code amendments under the law.
In the second case, Lum Yip Kee v. City & County of Honolulu,58 the
issue of zoning by initiative was raised briefly. However, the court did
not rule on its validity because the Honolulu City Council passed an
ordinance essentially the same as that approved by the voters, rendering
the issue of ballot box zoning validity moot. 59
Shortly after Lum Yip Kee, the court got its chance to rule on zoning
by initiative when it decided Kaiser Hawaii Kai Development Co. v. City
& County of Honolulu6° (Sandy Beach). In Sandy Beach the Lum Court
seized upon the opportunity to reinforce the importance of the planning
process in land use policy which it had stressed in Lum Yip Kee.6' The
controversy in Sandy Beach centered around the proposed development
of a parcel of land located in Hawai'i Kai. Sandy Beach, a popular
surfing and picnic area, is located across the street from the proposed
development. The property had been zoned for residential use since
1954. During the permit application process, 62 the public expressed its
concern about the impact of the development on Sandy Beach. When
Id. at 326, 653 P.2d at 773.
5' Id. at 328, 653 P.2d at 774 (citing Life of the Land v. City Council, 61 Haw.
390, 606 P.2d 866 (1980) (Marumoto, J.)).
16 Id. at 329-30, 653 P.2d at 775.
57 Id.
70 Haw. 179, 767 P.2d 815 (1989) (Lum, C.J.).
59 Id. at 181, 767 P.2d at 817.
60 70 Haw. 480, 777 P.2d 244 (1989) (Wakatsuki, J.).
63 See supra part II.
62 The parcel in question required an SMA use permit under the Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA), HAW. REv. STAT. S 205A (1985). Sandy Beach, 70 Haw.
at 481-82, 777 P.2d at 245.
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the City Council granted the SMA use permit, the public opposition
turned into an initiative petition drive which had as its goal the
downzoning of the property from residential to preservation. 63
During the petition drive, the developer sought an injunction to keep
the Coalition, a group of citizens formed to prevent the development,
from putting the petition on the ballot and a declaration that zoning
by initiative constituted an illegal procedure to downzone the property.6
The circuit court ruled in favor of the developer and issued an
injunction. 65 The supreme court stayed the injunction but reserved the
right to decide the issue of zoning by initiative at a later date. 66 The
Coalition succeeded in putting the proposed initiative ordinance on the
ballot, and the voters approved the proposal in the general election in
November of 1988.67 Subsequent to the election, the supreme court
held that zoning by initiative was illegal. 6'
The court's reasoning in Sandy Beach focused primarily on the policy
expressed in the Zoning Enabling Act69 which "clearly indicates the
legislature's emphasis on comprehensive planning for reasoned and
orderly development." 70 It held that "zoning by initiative is inconsistent
with the goal of long range comprehensive planning."7 1 The court
distinguished Sandy Beach from Nukoli'i by declaring that "the court in
the Nukolii case was not faced with the issue of whether zoning by
referendum is permissible in light of [Hawaii Revised Statutes section]
46-4(a)." 7 2 Therefore, Nukoli'i was inapposite.7 3
The Lum Court has decided that the use of initiative to rezone land
is not available to voters of Hawai'i under current law because such
zoning is inconsistent with long-range planning. It is interesting to
note the effect that initiative has had on public officials, however. In
both Lum Yip Kee and Sandy Beach, the City Council amended the
zoning ordinances to do what the initiatives were intended to do. If
63 Id. at 492, 777 P.2d at 246.




6 Id. Nevertheless, the City Council did in fact downzone the subject property in
accordance with the purpose of the now-illegal initiative vote.
69 HAW. REV. STAT. S 46-4 (1985).
'0 70 Haw. at 484, 777 P.2d at 246-47.
71 Id. at 484, 777 P.2d at 247.
72 Id. at 485, 777 P.2d at 248.
73 Id.
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the Council was acting in accordance with long-range comprehensive
planning when it amended the ordinances, as it must under the Charter,
then it is also arguable that the initiative votes were both in accordance
with comprehensive plans. Of course, it is the process, and not the
results, which is the key. That ballot box zoning may occasionally
result in the same decision that the comprehensive planning process
might produce is a far different "guarantee" than that the land use
decision-making process will always be required to accord with com-
prehensive planning.
Although initiative is no longer available as a means of rezoning,
there is a remote possibility that the applicability of referenda to land
use decision making remains unsettled. The court in Nukoli'i impliedly
approved of referendum as a means to amend the zoning code.
However, the Lur Court in Sandy Beach cited with approval several
mainland referendum cases which struck down referenda on various
grounds, including effect on planning, in the course of its decision.
Therefore the likelihood of the court's distinguishing between initiative
and referendum for land use decision making is remote.74 What will
continue is the court's emphasis on long-range comprehensive planning
and the requirement that zoning be based thereon.
In sum, while the Lur Court has clearly removed ballot box zoning
from the Hawai'i legal scene, it has done so on narrow, if predictable
grounds: illegal damage to Hawai'i's sophisticated land use plans and
planning process. However, there are many other bases for striking
down ballot box measures which attempt to reclassify property.7 5 It
14 The court's treatment of the referendum issue in Nukoli'i as "inapposite" to the
initiative issue in Sandy Beach is less convincing given that the issue of the validity of
referendum and planning were raised in Nukoli'i in the Motion for Reconsideration.
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, County of Kauai v. Pacific
Standard Life Insurance, 65 Haw. 318, 653 P.2d 766 (No. 8267) (1982). The court
denied the motion, though on what grounds is not clear. 65 Haw. 682 (1982). The
implication, though, is that the referendum was not subject to attack on grounds of
incompatibility with long range planning. If this is so, the court in Sandy Beach was
actually overruling that part of Nukoli'i which implied the validity of the referendum.
However, the court did cite with approval both Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 312
A.2d 154 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), and Leonard v. City of Bothell, 557
P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1976), both referendum cases, from which one would logically
conclude that, if confronted with any inconsistency between Nukoli'i and Sandy Beach,
it would in all likelihood reconsider and overrule Nukoli'i, even though there are
sufficient differences between initiative and referendum in terms of due process for
the court to make a distinction.
" See, e.g., Callies, Nueffer & Caliboso, supra note 46.
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would thus be a grave error to assume that simplistic legislative solutions
merely creating an exception from the land use planning process for
initiative and referendum would result in legal ballot box zoning for
Hawai' i.
IV. THE ROLE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT PROTECTION LAW
A. SMA Permits: Legislative, Quasyiudicial, or Something Else?
One of the most troublesome cases to come from the Lum Court is
Sandy Beach Defense Fund v. City Council.7 6 Ostensibly about the granting
of an SMA permit under local implementation of the state's Coastal
Zone Management Act77 (CZMA), the case tells a lot about the court's
views concerning legislative bodies acting in nonlegislative capacities.
After setting out the process by which the Honolulu City Council
grants SMA permits,78 the court correctly observed that the Hawaii
Administrative Procedure Act7 9 (HAPA) provides no basis for requiring
a contested case hearing since HAPA specifically and categorically
exempts legislative bodies from its requirements. 8° It is an unfortunate
and myopic exemption for an instance such as the granting of an SMA
76 70 Haw. 361, 773 P.2d 250 (1989) (Lum, C.J.).
71 HAW. REV. STAT. § 205A (1985). The Legislature enacted the CZMA in 1977
to provide for the effective planning, management, beneficial use, protection, and
development of the coastal zones of the State. For a detailed discussion of the adoption
of the CZMA by Hawai'i, see CALLIES, supra note 1.
78 Space is too short to fully describe the process and the court's reasoning on this
issue, but see Lea Oksoon Hong, Recent Development, Sandy Beach Defense Fund
v. City & County of Honolulu: The Sufficiency of Legislative Hearings in an Administrative
Setting, 12 U. HAW. L. REV. 499 (1990).
71 HAW. REV. STAT. S 91 (1985).
80 HAW. REV. STAT. $ 91-1(1) (1985); Sandy Beach Defense Fund, 70 Haw. at 369,
773 P.2d at 256.
The Richardson Court decided a case with facts similar to those in Sandy Beach
Defense Fund. In Town v. Land Use Commission, 55 Haw. 538, 524 P.2d 84 (1974)
(Kobayashi, J.), the court had to characterize a district designation amendment
proceeding. The court held that because the plaintiff, who was an adjacent owner to
the parcel in question, had a property interest at stake, the proceeding was properly
to be characterized as a contested case proceeding under HAPA. Id. at 548, 524 P.2d
at 91. Despite the Town holding, the court in Sandy Beach Defense Fund did not look at
the interests claimed to be at stake by appellants. Rather it chose to look only at the
exemption which HAPA provides to the City Council as a legislative body. 70 Haw.
at 369, 773 P.2d at 256.
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permit in which the Honolulu City Council is clearly acting in its
quasijudicial, and not its legislative, capacity.8' However, the court
then proceeded, unaccountably, to hold that the CZMA does not
require such a contested case hearing either, but merely an informa-
tional one.82 Because the CZMA contemplates that each county will
choose its own method of considering SMA permit applications, by
designating the City Council-a HAPA-exempt body-as the appro-
priate body, Honolulu has opted for informational hearings rather than
contested case hearings.83
It is difficult to follow the court's distinction in Sandy Beach Defense
Fund of its previous decisions in which neighbor island counties were
required to hold contested case hearings for SMA permits. 84 The
R1 The absurdity of this exemption is evident when one considers-as appellants
and Justice Nakamura in dissent did-that SMA permits are considered on the neighbor
islands by county planning commissions, not county councils, thereby presumably
making HAPA applicable to the SMA process there, but not in Honolulu, purely on
the basis of which body doles out the permit!
The exemption becomes even more troublesome when considered in light of Kailua
Community Council v. City & County of Honolulu, 60 Haw. 428, 591 P.2d 602
(1979) (Menor, J.). In Kailua, the court held that to the extent that the chief planning
officer and the planning commission were engaged in purely advisory functions akin
to legislative committee work when reviewing applications for amendments to the
general plan, their role is part of the legislative process and they are therefore not
subject to HAPA requirements, along with the city council. Id. at 433-34, 591 P.2d
at 606. "To hold otherwise would, by indirection, extend the application of the HAPA
to the actions of the city council which by its terms the Act has excluded from
operation. [HAW. REV. STAT.] S 91-1(1)." Id.
Arguably the court applied a functional approach in Kadua to reach its conclusion,
which extended the HAPA exemption to government bodies which are executive
administrative agencies rather than legislative. In contrast, the Sandy Beach Defense Fund
court did not look beyond the title of the government body in its analysis. The effect
of these two cases is to allow greater freedom to government bodies to act without the
procedural safeguards of HAPA.
82 Sandy Beach Defense Fund, 70 Haw. at 373, 773 P.2d at 258.
Id. at 372-73, 773 P.2d at 258.
Mahuiki v. Planning Comm'n, 65 Haw. 506, 654 P.2d 874 (1982) (Nakamura,
J.); Chang v. Planning Comm'n, 64 Haw. 431, 643 P.2d 55 (1982) (Lum, C.J.). In
Chang the court observed that an "SMA use permit application proceeding was a
'contested case' within the meaning of [HAW. REV. STAT.] chapter 91." Id. at 436,
643 P.2d at 60. Also, "[t]he State Coastal Zone Management Act and corresponding
planning commission rules specifically make [HAw. REv. STAT.] S 91-9 and planning
commission contested case procedures applicable to proceedings on SMA use appli-
cations in Maui County." Id. Mahuiki involved the Kauai planning commission, and
reiterated the observation in Chang that an SMA use permit application proceeding
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difference is based merely on the fact that in the neighbor island
counties it is the planning commissions-which are not HAPA-ex-
empt-which issue the SMA permits rather than the county council. 8
Protect Ala Wai Skyline v. Land Use and Controls Committee6 provides
another example of the judiciary's approach to the City Council acting
in a non-legislative manner. The case involved a challenge to the
granting of an SMA use permit by the Honolulu City Council. 7 The
I.C.A. concluded that the incorporation of the specific findings in a
committee report, rather than in the resolution issuing the permit, did
not violate the CZMA. ss Although this decision may be seen as
procedurally based, it does reflect the policy that when the Honolulu
City Council acts in a non-legislative function, such as the issuing of
permits, different standards will apply to these functions.
Hopefully, the court will find an early opportunity to revisit the
legislative/quasijudicial issue. The distinction which it has so far es-
poused leads to differences in results among the four counties for the
self-same permitting process, based almost solely on the nature of the
body considering the permit, rather than the nature of the process and
the permit. Whatever the result, the Lum Court's construction of
HAPA and the CZMA requirements has been strict. And, as the
discussion below indicates, strict construction is something the court
does consistently.
B. SMA Permits and Process: Strict Construction of Procedural Requirements
Both the Hawaii Supreme Court and the I.C.A. have had oppor-
tunity to construe the procedural requirements of the CZMA, and
specifically, the granting of SMA permits. Both have chosen to construe
the CZMA strictly, thereby giving effect to legislative intent.
In Hui Alaloa v. Planning Commission of the County of Maui,89 the Maui
Planning Commission issued two SMA use permits under the CZMA
for the construction of a 150-unit condominium project and develop-
ment of a nearby beach park facility and access road on the island of
was a contested case hearing under HAPA. Mahuiki, 65 Haw. at 513, 654 P.2d at
879.
Sandy Beach Defense Fund, 70 Haw. at 373, 773 P.2d at 258-59.
' 6 Haw. App. 540, 735 P.2d 950 (1987) (Heen, J.).
I ld. at 542, 735 P.2d at 952.
Id. at 546, 735 P.2d at 955.
19 68 Haw. 135, 705 P.2d 1042 (1985) (Wakatsuki, J.).
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Moloka'i. 9° The Planning Commission issued both permits, after hold-
ing contested case and public hearings, on the condition that the
developer undertake further archaeological survey and excavation. 9'
The court vacated the permits92 because the Planning Commission
had failed to meet the procedural requirements of the CZMA: 93 the
county agency authorized to issue permits must first find the proposed
development consistent with the objectives and policies of the act; 94 it
could not issue them when further study was needed to determine if
the objectives of the CZMA would be met. 95
In Hui Malama Aina 0 Ko'olau v. Pacarro,96 the I.C.A. held that the
developer fell outside the requirements of the CZMA due to a grand-
father clause included in a 1975 legislative act. 97 There, a community
organization attempted to prevent the development of a 164-unit town
house project on the windward coast of O'ahu. 98 The Honolulu City
Council approved the planned development in an ordinance adopted
on July 21, 1975. 99 The ordinance contained a time-limit clause which
provided that failure to secure building permits within one year of
adoption of the ordinance "may" constitute grounds for the City
Council to repeal the ordinance.'00 However, upon timely request by
the applicant, the City Council had the option of granting an extension
of time.' 0' The appellant argued that the CZMA had been violated
because an SMA use permit was required before the Council could
approve the extension of time.102 The I.C.A. held that the developer
90 Id. at 135-36, 705 P.2d at 1043.
91 Id. at 136-37, 705 P.2d at 1044.
91 Id. at 138, 705 P.2d at 1045.
91 HAw. REv. STAT. S 205A (1985).
Hui Alaloa, 68 Haw. at 137, 705 P.2d at 1044. Policies include identifying and
analyzing significant archaeological resources; maximizing information retention through
preservation of remains and artifacts or salvage operations; and supporting state goals
for protection, restoration, interpretation, and display of historic resources. Id. at 136,
705 P.2d at 1044.
95 Id.
96 4 Haw. App. 304, 666 P.2d 177 (1983) (Bums, CJ.).
91 Id. at 319-20, 666 P.2d at 187 (construing Act 176, § 3, 1975 Haw. Sess. Laws
389).
91 Id. at 305, 666 P.2d at 179.
9 Id.
100 Id. at 306, 666 P.2d at 179.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 318-19, 666 P.2d at 186. CZMA provides that "no agency authorized to
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was exempt from this requirement under the "grandfather clause"
contained in section 3 of Act 176:103 "[t]his part shall not apply to
developments or structures for which a building permit, planned de-
velopment permit, planned unit development permit or ordinance, or
special permit for cluster development was issued prior to December
1, 1975."' The court did not accept appellant's argument that "de-
velopments" refers to "actual developments" and not to some concep-
tual proposal or plan.'015 It concluded that the "natural and most
obvious import of the grandfather clause is that the requirements of
the Hawaii CZM Act are not applicable to any development, existing
or planned. " 106
C. Summary
The court's treatment of the CZMA has been one of strict construc-
tion. It has lead to certain inconsistencies, some of which are arguably
of the court's making, while others appear to be inherent in the CZMA
itself. For example, the court has strictly construed HAPA and the
CZMA so as to insulate legislative bodies from their requirements.
This results in further ramifications from inconsistency in treatment of
government bodies built into the statutes themselves. The counties have
the choice to be exempt from the procedural safeguards usually afforded
when administrative/quasijudicial bodies make decisions. In this area,
the court has taken a non-activist, strict constructionist role, leaving
the decision to deal with the inconsistency for the legislature. Arguably,
that is where it belongs.
V. STANDING
A hallmark of the Richardson years was the clear and unmistakable
broadening of the standing rights of citizens and citizens' groups before
administrative agencies, especially where environmental interests were
concerned.'017 As the Richardson Court in Mahuiki declared: "[W]here
issue permits pertaining to any development within the special management area shall
authorize any development unless approval is first received in accordance with the
procedures adopted pursuant to this part." HAW. REv. STAT. S 205A-29(b) (1985).
103 Act 176, § 3, 1975 Haw. Sess. Laws 389.
4 Haw. App. at 319, 666 P.2d at 186.
101 Id. at 319-20, 666 P.2d at 186-87.
016 Id. at 320, 666 P.2d at 187.
'o' See, e.g., Mahuiki v. Planning Comm'n of Kauai, 65 Haw. 506, 654 P.2d 874
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the interests at stake are in the realm of environmental concerns 'we
(1982) (Nakamura, J.). In Mahuiki, a developer sought permission from Kauai Planning
Commission to develop property subject to CZMA regulations. Id. at 508, 654 P.2d
at 876. In response to requests for testimony on developer's request for necessary
permits for the project, objections were voiced orally and in writing regarding the
project's adverse environmental consequences. Id. at 509, 654 P.2d at 876-77. Two
of the appellants submitted a written response to the request. Id. at 509, 654 P.2d at
877. After "qualified endorsement" of the project by the Planning Director, the
Commission granted the permits with conditions, despite reservations by several of
the commissioners. Id. at 511, 654 P.2d at 877-78. Appellants appealed to Fifth Circuit
Court under Hawaii Revised Statutes section 91-14, which allows any person "aggrieved
by a final decision and order in a contested case" to invoke judicial review. Id. at
513, 654 P.2d at 879. Circuit Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that appellants
had not participated in the administrative proceedings. Id. Upon review, the court set
forth the following "guiding tenet": "where the interests at stake are in the realm of
environmental concerns 'we have not been inclined to foreclose challenges to admin-
istrative determinations through restrictive applications of standing requirements.''
Id. (quoting Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm'n, 63 Haw. 166, 171, 623 P.2d
431, 438 (1981) (Nakamura, J.)).
The court, having no difficulty determining that there was a final decision and order
in a contested case, then had to decide whether appellants had shown that "their
interests were injured and they were involved in the administrative proceedings that
culminated in the unfavorable decision." Id. at 514-15, 654 P.2d at 879-80. The
interests involved here were "essentially aesthetic and environmental in character,"
which the court had previously recognized as sufficient to confer standing when such
interests are "personal" and "special", or when there is a property interest involved.
Id. at 515, 654 P.2d at 880 (citing Life of the Land, Inc. v. Land Use Comm'n, 61
Haw. 3, 8, 594 P.2d 1079, 1082 (1979) (Richardson, C.J.)). The court found personal
and special interests at stake, since the development would negatively impact the
environment in the area in which the appellants lived. Id. As for involvement in a
contested case hearing, the court stated that it had not "conditioned standing to appeal
from an administrative decision 'upon formal intervention in the agency proceeding."'
Id. (quoting Jordan v. Hamada, 62 Haw. 444, 449, 616 P.2d 1368, 1371 (1980)
(Nakamura, J.)). "Participation in a hearing as an adversary ... has been held
sufficient to give rise to appeal rights . . . ." Id. (quoting Jordan, 62 Haw. at 449, 616
P.2d at 1372). Since two of the appellants had written a letter that was a part of the
record, the adversary participation requirement was satisfied, and standing to challenge
the Commission decision was conferred on appellants (at least the two that wrote the
letter). Id. The court then went on to find that the Commission had not complied
with the requirements of the CZMA and, therefore, the case was remanded. Id. at
516-20, 654 P.2d at 880-83.
Mahuiki continued a line of cases by the Richardson Court which extended standing
rights. In Dalton v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 400, 462 P.2d 199 (1969)
(Kobayashi, J.), the court conferred standing on individuals who lived across the street
from a proposed high rise development and who wished to challenge a general plan
amendment. Id. at 403, 462 P.2d at 202. Because the development would result in
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have not been inclined to foreclose challenges to administrative deter-
minations through restrictive applications of standing requirements.""°8
The Lum Court retreats not an iota from this position in the two land
use cases which raised the issue most prominently: City & Couny of
Honolulu v. F.E. Trotter, Inc. 109 and Kona Old Hawaiian Trails Group v.
Lyman. 110
In Kona Old Hawaiian Trails, the court held that parties may have
standing to pursue a land use case, even if the particular controversy
is moot, provided there is a public interest question to be resolved."11
The case arose over the challenge to the granting of an SMA permit
by the County of Hawaii's Planning Commission under the authority
of the State CZMA 112 for the construction of a roadway and installation
of utility lines pursuant to a four-lot residential planned unit develop-
ment.'I " Kona Old Hawaiian Trails, a group of Kona residents formed
to protect ancient trails and access routes, objected and sought judicial
review of the permit issuance. 114 It claimed that the public trust had
been violated and that procedures required by the CZMA and by
HAPA had not been followed."' The owners, having finished the work
under a valid permit and having sold the property, sought dismissal
of the suit on the ground that the controversy was now moot.
116
"restricting the scenic view, limiting the sense of space and increasing the density of
population," the court held that this was a "concrete interest" in a "legal relation"
so as to give standing. Id.
In East Diamond Head Ass'n v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 52 Haw. 518, 479 P.2d
796 (1971) (Kobayashi, J.), the court granted standing to a private unincorporated
organization consisting of individuals who owned or resided upon land neighboring
the parcel which was the subject of a zoning variance proceeding. The court stated
that the appellants in this case asserted the same rights as those in Dalton; that is,
"an owner whose property adjoins land subject to rezoning has a legal interest worthy
of judicial recognition should he seek redress in our courts to preserve the continued
enjoyment of his realty by protecting it from threatening neighborhood change." Id.
at 521-22, 497 P.2d at 798.
108 Mahuiki v. Planning Comm'n of Kauai, 65 Haw. 506, 512, 654 P.2d 874, 878
(1982) (Nakamura, J.) (quoting Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm'n, 63 Haw.
166, 171, 623 P.2d 431, 438 (1981) (Nakamura, J.)).
'09 70 Haw. 18, 757 P.2d 647 (1988) (Lum, CJ.).
,,' 69 Haw. 81, 734 P.2d 161 (1987) (Nakamura, J.).
' Id. at 87, 734 P.2d at 165.
112 HAW. REV. STAT. § 205A (1985), which implements the federal CZMA and for
which the State of Hawaii has been exceedingly well-paid.
"' Kona Old Hawaiian Trails, 69 Haw. at 84, 734 P.2d at 164.
114 Id.
"5 Id. at 86, 734 P.2d at 164-65.
116 Id. at 86, 734 P.2d at 165.
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The court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Nakamura, found
nevertheless that the suit "retains vitality."'' 7 While the court noted
that there was still some construction left to be done, it nevertheless
observed that
even if all of the work sanctioned by the two permits is finished, a basis
for the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction remains. For we recognize
that in exceptional situations mootness is not an obstacle to the consid-
eration of an appeal .... We think the situation would call for the
exercise of our appellate jurisdiction even if there is no more work to
be done under the minor permit. The questions posed here are of public
concern and, even if they recur in the future, are of a nature that would
be as likely as not to become moot before they could be determined on
appeal.1 8
Although standing was conferred upon Kona Old Hawaiian Trails,
it eventually lost the appeal. The court determined that first of all,
Kona Old Hawaiian Trails had failed to avail itself of the opportunity
for an agency hearing on SMA permits provided by Hawaii County
Charter." 9 Thus it had deprived itself, and the court, of a final decision
or order in a contested case hearing'20 which would otherwise have
been reviewable under HAPA.121 Second, it could not avail itself of
the CZMA provision allowing "any person ... [to] commence a civil
action alleging that any agency" has breached the CZMA 122 because,
until that matter had been appealed to the county zoning board of
appeals, it was not a judicial action of which the court could be
cognizant for lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 123 In sum,
as the court itself observed, Kona Old Hawaiian Trails failed because
of the timing of its appeal in the administrative process, not because
of any standing or aggrieved party problems.124
This broad approach to the open court room door was affirmed by
Chief Justice Lum in the unanimously decided opinion of City & County
of Honolulu v. F.E. Trotter, Inc.12' There the court held that a private
"I Id. at 87, 734 P.2d at 165.
,18 Id. at 87-88, 734 P.2d at 165-66.
1,9 HAWAII, HAW., CHARTER art. V, § 5-4.3 (1980).
20 Kona Old Hawaiian Trails, 69 Haw. at 92, 734 P.2d at 168.
121 HAW. REv. STAT. 5 91-14(a) (1985).
122 HAW. REv. STAT. $ 205A-6 (1985).
123 69 Haw. at 93-94, 734 P.2d at 169.
124 Id.
125 70 Hlaw. 18, 757 P.2d 647 (1988) (Lum, C.J.).
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landfill operator was able to challenge a taking by the City and County
of Honolulu of property for a landfill, even though the operator had
only an unrecorded lease in the premises which terminated upon
condemnation. The court stated:
A party has standing if he alleges such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy that the court should exercise its remedial powers on
his behalf. [The landfill operator] has a personal interest in the outcome
because it is an unrecorded lessee of the property being condemned.
Thus, [it] has standing to challenge the validity of the taking. 126
The court, however, refused to grant the operator relief because it
had not yet commenced any operations on the subject property, and
had no city permits to do so.'27
I.C.A. decisions have not uniformly applied the standing rule de-
veloped in the Richardson Court and upheld under Chief Justice Lum.
In Waikiki Discount Bazaar v. City & County, 128 the I.C.A. found Waikiki
Discount did not have standing because it failed to make the requisite
showing to support its allegations.1 2 9 Waikiki Discount alleged, inter
alia, that (1) Hemmeter Center Company had persuaded Waikiki
Discount to terminate their lease and had subsequently defaulted on
an agreement to provide retail space and (2) the City and County
illegally and knowingly allowed Hemmeter to violate certain Compre-
hensive Zoning Code requirements and fire regulations. 30 A member
of the public may sue to enforce the rights of the public if he can show
that he has suffered an injury in fact. 3' The plaintiff must show that
(1) he has suffered actual or threatened injury as a result of the
defendant's alleged illegal conduct; (2) the injury can be traced to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be remedied by a
favorable decision. 3 2 This dispute did not concern an environmental
issue and so the court was not required to apply the standing rule
126 Id. at 20-21, 757 P.2d at 649 (citing Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm'n,
63 Haw. 166, 172, 623 P.2d 431, 438 (1981) (Nakamura, J.)).
27 Id. at 22, 757 P.2d at 650.
128 5 Haw. App. 635, 706 P.2d 1315 (1985) (Bums, C.J.).
129 Id. at 641, 706 P.2d at 1320.
,30 Id. at 640-41, 706 P.2d at 1319.
"I Id. at 641, 706 P.2d at 1319 (citing Akau v. Olomana Corp., 65 Haw. 383, 652
P.2d 1130 (1982) (Richardson, C.J.)).
2 Id. at 641, 706 P.2d at 1319-20 (citing Akau v. Olomana, 65 Haw. 383, 389,
652 P.2d 1134, 1135 (1982)).
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liberally. The situation in Protect Ala Wai Skyline v. Land Use and Controls
Committee'33 presented an environmentally related dispute in which the
standing of the appellants was an issue.
In Protect Ala Wai Skyline, the I.C.A. applied the liberal standing rule
for environmental concerns. The I.C.A. held that appellee's argument
that appellant lacked standing was without merit. 34 Appellee asserted
that because appellant had not incorporated until after the Honolulu
City Council granted the SMA use permit, appellant could not raise
the permit issue.' 35 The I.C.A. decided that if appellant was not granted
standing, the two individuals who had extensively involved themselves
from the beginning would be denied the opportunity to show that the
permit was illegal.
3 6
However, in Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal,'37 the I.C.A. held
that appellants had no standing to raise a due process issue because
appellants had not shown any injury. 3 8 In this case the appellants
appealed the Hawaii County Planning Commission's award of a geo-
thermal resource permit claiming it was invalid due to violation of
their due process rights.'3 9 Appellants argued that the rule providing
that a reasonable attempt to notify residents within one thousand feet
of the geothermal project's boundaries did not meet minimum due
process requirements because it was not large enough to cover everyone
who might suffer injury to property or health from the project.' 4
Persons seeking to challenge an agency's rule that an applicant for a
geothermal development permit must make a reasonable attempt to give
notice of a public hearing on its application to residents beyond 300 feet
but within 1000 feet of the perimeter of the project's boundaries on the
ground that the rule is facially inadequate because the geothermal
development activity has the potential to affect property and human
health over large areas of the region, but who have not shown they have
been injured by the rule, have no standing to raise the issue.'14
The court did not use lack of standing to justify dismissal of
appellants' other arguments; 4 2 however, this decision does seem to
1 6 Haw. App. 540, 735 P.2d 950 (1987) (Heen, J.).
134 Id. at 543, 735 P.2d at 953.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 544, 735 P.2d at 953.
137 8 Haw. App. 203, 797 P.2d 69 (1990) (Heen, J.).
138 Id. at 211, 797 P.2d at 73.
139 Id. at 210, 797 P.2d at 73.
140 Id. at 211, 797 P.2d at 73.
1"I Id. at 204, 797 P.2d at 70.
142 Id. at 209-10, 797 P.2d at 72. Appellants claimed that HAW. REV. STAT. S 205-
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move away from the broad rule of standing.
The Lum Court has chosen to continue to allow broad standing to
seek judicial review of agency decisions in cases of environmental
concern. Although this appears to be a victory for environmental
groups, as the following discussion of administrative decisions and
agencies shows, having the opportunity to challenge agency decisions
in court is not likely to result in their being overturned since the Lum
Court holds fast to a policy of deference to agency decisions.
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS AND AGENCIES
The Lum Court has continuously expressed the view that the deci-
sions of administrative agencies and officials are presumptively correct,
and cannot be set aside unless the entire record shows them to be
clearly erroneous in view of reliable, probative and substantial evi-
dence. 4 Although the court liberally interprets standing requirements
in environmental actions,'" it does not extend this policy to adminis-
trative decisions affecting environmental issues.
Stop H-3 Association challenged the Board of Land and Natural
Resources' granting of a conservation district use permit to the State
Department of Transportation. 45 The permit allowed for construction
of an interstate highway through a conservation district.'" The court
noted that it would not allow an administrative decision to stand if
application of the regulation would achieve a statutorily impermissible
end. 147 However, the court held that Hawaii Revised Statutes section 183-
41(c)(3) authorized the Department of Land and Natural Resources to
permit land utilizations that are not detrimental to the conservation of
necessary forest growth, the conservation and development of adequate
5.1, which authorizes the issuance of geothermal permits, violated their due process
rights. Id. The court held that the statute had already been found to comply with all
constitutional requirements. Id. (citing Medeiros v. Hawaii County Planning Comm'n,
8 Haw. App. 183, 797 P.2d 59 (1990) (Heen, J.)).
"I Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dep't of Transportation, 68 Haw. 154, 706 P.2d 446 (1985)
(Lum, C.J).
See supra part V.
Stop H-3 Ass'n, 68 Haw. at 155, 706 P.2d at 448.
146 Id. at 156, 706 P.2d at 448.
"I Id. at 161, 706 P.2d at 451 (citing Hall v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 116, 119 (5th
Cir. 1981)).
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water resources for present and future needs, and the conservation and
preservation of open spaces for the public use and enjoyment. 4' The
court accepted the Board of Land and Natural Resources' findings that
the highway would have significant effects on the conservation district
but would not be injurious to forest growth, water resources, and open
spaces. 49 The court concluded that the contesting party had failed to
meet its burden of showing the Board's findings of fact to be clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record.
150
The statutory interpretation practiced by the court strengthens the
deference shown to an administrative agency's decision. The court has
stated that its primary duty in interpreting statutes is to give effect to
the legislature's intent which, in the absence of a clearly contrary
expression, is conclusively obtained from the language of the statute
itself. '51 The court applied this rule very precisely in Maha'ulepu v. Land
Use Commission. 152
In Maha'ulepu, the dispute involved the issuance of a special use
permit by the Kauai county planning commission for the construction
of a golf course on prime agricultural land. 53 The appellants raised
two issues on appeal: (1) whether Hawaii Revised Statutes section 205,
as amended by Act 298,154 authorized the Land Use Commission and
the county planning commission to issue special use permits for golf
courses on agricultural B lands; 155 and (2) whether the planning com-
mission committed procedural irregularities which deprived appellant
of a full and fair hearing. 156 The supreme court gave the decision of
I'" Id.
149 Id. The Board of Land and Natural Resources, also known as the Land Board,
acts in executive fashion as a "director" does in other state agencies, but in addition
has quasijudicial functions as well, particularly with respect to permitting uses on both
public and private lands classified under the state land use law by the Land Use
Commission in the Conservation District. For further discussion of both the Land
Board and Land Use Commission statutory duties and activities see BOSSELMAN &
CALLIES; CALLIES; MANDELKER AND MYERS, all supra note 1.
150 Stop H-3 Ass'n, 68 Haw. at 161-62, 706 P.2d at 451-52.
151 Id. at 161, 706 P.2d at 451.
152 71 Haw. 332, 709 P.2d 906 (1990) (Lum, C.J.); see also Douglas K. Ushijima,
Note, Maha'ulepu v. Land Use Commission: A Symbol of Change; Hawaii's Land Use
Law Allows Golf Course Development on Prime Agricultural Land by Special Use Permit, 13 U.
HAw. L. REV. 205 (1991).
153 Maha'ulepu, 71 Haw. at 334-35, 709 P.2d at 907-08.
, 1985 Haw. Sess. Laws 298.
155 Id. at 333-34, 709 P.2d at 907.
Id. at 339, 709 P.2d at 910.
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the agencies wide latitude in its holding. The court held that statutes
should be read as being in accord, and not in conflict, with each
other. 157 Further, the court noted that it does not support repeals by
implication so that wherever possible an earlier statute should be
presumed to remain in force, and not repeal a later statute. 158 Related
to the second issue, the court held that deference should be accorded
to an administrative agency's interpretation of its own procedural rules
unless the decision is clearly erroneous or inconsistent with underlying
legislative purposes.159
The I.C.A. appears to follow the lead of the Hawaii Supreme Court
in its reluctance to overturn administrative agency decisions related to
land use and zoning. Actions brought contesting administrative deci-
sions usually result in judgment for the agency, even where the agency's
actions constituted illegal procedure. Outdoor Circle v. Harold K.L. Castle
Trust Estate'6° exemplifies this point.16'
In Outdoor Circle, the I.C.A.'s opinion stressed the presumption of
validity accorded to decisions of administrative bodies acting within
their sphere of expertise. A party challenging a decision carries a heavy
burden because the challenging party must show that the order is
157 Id. at 337-38, 709 P.2d at 909.
158 Id.
,19 Id. at 339, 709 P.2d at 910.
160 4 Haw. App. 633, 675 P.2d 748 (1983) (Tanaka, J.), cert. denied, 67 Haw. 1,
677 P.2d 965 (1984) (per curiam).
161 Chang v. Planning Comm'n of County of Maui, 64 Haw. 431, 643 P.2d 55
(1982) (Lum, J.), also illustrates this point. In Chang a resident appealed the decision
by the Maui Planning Commission to grant an SMA use permit for the development
of a condominium project. Id. at 432-33, 643 P.2d at 58. The challenge focused on
the Planning Commission's failure to adhere to the notice and open deliberations
requirements of HAPA, Hawaii Revised Statutes chapter 92, Planning Commission
Rules, and the County Charter. While agreeing that the Commission had not followed
the exact notice requirements of HAPA S 91-9, the court nevertheless stated that
"while the planning commission may have committed a technical statutory violation
in its published notices, appellant cannot be heard to complain of harm or injustice
caused thereby as he subsequently received ample notice ...... Id. at 440, 643 P.2d
at 62. The court further determined that the Commission had carried on closed
deliberations in contravention of planning commission rules and the Maui County
Charter. Id. at 443-44, P.2d 643 at 64. Still, this did not entitle appellant to voidance
of the SMA use permit because "appellant has failed to allege or otherwise establish
that his substantial rights may have been prejudiced by the commission's closure of
deliberations." Id. at 444, 643 P.2d at 65. The court placed the burden on the person
challenging the closed deliberation to allege impropriety during the its course, a difficult
task. Id.
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unjust and unreasonable in its consequences. Even a procedural vio-
lation on the part of the agency may not lighten this burden.
In Outdoor Circle the State Department of Planning and Economic
Development (D.P.E.D.) filed a petition with the Land Use Commis-
sion (L.U.C.) requesting reclassification of approximately 244 acres
from urban to conservation land. 162 After conducting the required pre-
hearing conference and public hearings pursuant to Hawaii Revised
Statutes section 205-4(e)(1), the L.U.C. denied the petition. 163 D.P.E.D.
appealed the L.U.C.'s decision and appellants were allowed to intervene
in the action.'16 The L.U.C. claimed that after accepting the final
version of the findings of fact and voting to deny D.P.E.D.'s petition
at open meetings, its adjudicatory functions were concluded.' 6 The
work remaining was simple "housekeeping chores" which were not
adjudicatory functions requiring any further open meetings; therefore,
the L.U.C. declared that it had not violated the Sunshine Law. 166 The
I.C.A. did not agree with the L.U.C.'s interpretation of its functions
as non-adjudicatory. 167 However, because an agency decision is voidable
only "upon proof of wilful violation" of the Sunshine Law, 168 the
I.C.A. upheld the L.U.C. decision despite the statutory non-compliance
of the decision process. 169 The I.C.A. also discussed the standard of
review for an appellate court reviewing a circuit court's review of an
administrative agency's decision 7 ° and concluded that the "right/wrong"
standard should replace the previous standard of clearly erroneous.' 7 '
The supreme court agreed with the result and reasoning of the court
162 Outdoor Circle, 4 Haw. App. at 635-36, 675 P.2d at 787 (1983); see generally
CALLIES, supra note 1, for a description of the land classification process of the Land
Use Commission.
163 4 Haw. App. at 637, 675 P.2d at 788.
164 Id.
151 Id. at 641, 675 P.2d at 791.
,66 Id. HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 92, codifies the Hawaii Sunshine Law. The policy and
intent behind the Sunshine Law is to open up the governmental processes to public
scrutiny and participation as the only viable and reasonable method of protecting the
public's interest. HAW. REv. STAT. S 92-1. Under S 92-3 "[e]very meeting of all
boards shall be open to the public and persons shall be permitted to attend any
meeting unless otherwise provided in the constitution or as closed pursuant to sections
92-4 and 92-5." Id. S 92-3 (1985).
167 4 Haw. App. at 642, 675 P.2d at 791.
16 Id. (quoting HAW. REV. STAT. S 92-11 (1976)).
169 Id.
170 Id. at 638, 675 P.2d at 789.
171 Id. at 640, 675 P.2d at 790.
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below and denied appellants' writ of certiorari.12 The supreme court
did not address the question of the proper standard of review because
under either standard the evidence supported the circuit court's deci-
sion.'I"
In Kilauea Neighborhood Ass'n v. Land Use Commission,74 the I.C.A.
again stressed the presumption of validity attached to an administrative
agency's decision and the heavy burden carried by a party seeking to
void the decision. 17 5 In this case, the appellee filed a petition with the
L.U.C. requesting reclassification of approximately twenty-eight acres
in Kaua'i from agricultural to urban to allow for development of the
land for light industrial use.7 6 The L.U.C. approved reclassification
of fifteen acres.'77 The appellants claimed that the L.U.C.'s findings
of fact and conclusions of law did not meet the statutory requirements
of Hawaii Revised Statutes section 205-4 which outlines the procedures
to be followed in amending district boundaries. 78 The I.C.A. found
that although the L.U.C.'s findings were poorly drawn, the record
sufficiently supported its decisions. 179 The I.C.A. noted that an agency's
findings of fact are reviewable for clear error while its conclusions of
law are freely reviewable. 8 ° The I.C.A. emphasized that where an
appellant claims the trial court failed to make adequate findings of
fact, the appellate court will examine the entire record to determine
whether the findings are (1) supported by the evidence, and (2)
sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues in the case to
form a basis for the conclusions of law.''
In Protect Ala Wai Skyline v. Land Use & Controls Committee18 2 the
appellant conceded that although the project in question generally
complied with the General Plan's policy of maintaining the viability of
O'ahu's visitor industry, the project conflicted with the General Plan
,,2 Outdoor Circle, 67 Haw. 1, 3, 677 P.2d 965, 965 (1984).
173 Id.
,14 7 Haw. App. 227, 751 P.2d 1031 (1988) (Heen, J.).
175 Id. at 230, 751 P.2d at 1034.
,76 Id. at 229, 751 P.2d at 1033.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 230, 751 P.2d at 1034.
179 Id. at 233, 751 P.2d at 1035.
I' Id. at 229, 751 P.2d at 1034 (citing Protect Ala Wai Skyline v. Land Use &
Control Comm., 6 Haw. App. 540, 735 P.2d 950 (1987) (Heen, J.)).
,81 Id. at 233, 751 P.2d at 1035 (citing Nani Koolau Co. v. K & M Construction,
Inc., 5 Haw. App. 137, 140, 681 P.2d 580, 584 (1984) (Heen, J.)).
,82 6 Haw. App. 540, 735 P.2d 950 (1987) (Heen, J.).
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in its policies of prohibiting major increases in densities and further
growth in Waikiki, and preserving O'ahu's beauty, natural environ-
ment, and scenic views. 83 The court found this argument to be without
merit.8 4 The court held that "[t]he Council's interpretation of the
General Plan is to be given deference unless plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the underlying legislative purpose.1 18 5 The court
deferred to the City Council's interpretation because of the Council's
frequent use and familiarity with the General Plan.18 6
The Lum Court tends to defer to the administrative agencies (and
legislative bodies acting in nonlegislative capacities) making land use
decisions and to interpret statutory language as broadly as necessary
in order to uphold an agency's decision. A party appealing an agency's
decision has a considerable burden to overcome. This is consistent with
the court's deference to other branches of government ahd not incon-
sistent with common judicial practice of placing the burden on those
who would challenge governmental action, particularly absent claims
involving civil rights and others calculated to protect minority rights.
Since government in theory represents the people who elect it, it is
not surprising that the burden falls on a litigant which challenges that
presumption, other things being equal.
VII. ZONING BOARDS AND VARIANCE
It is standard practice for those local governments which exercise
the power to zone to also provide for the varying of the requirements
of a zoning ordinance upon a showing of a land-use related hardship
by a petitioner. Usually this is accomplished by an administrative body
called a zoning board of appeals or board of adjustment. 8 7 While such
variances and boards are usually provided for in zoning enabling
statutes, in Hawai'i such authority is usually set out in county charters.
So it is with Honolulu, whose charter grants the authority specifically
to a zoning board of appeals.'8
183 Id. at 547, 735 P.2d at 955.
14 Id.
185 Id. at 547-48, 735 P.2d at 955 (citing Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 1357 v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 68 Haw. 316, 713 P.2d 943 (1986) (Padgett, J.)).
,86 Id. at 548, 735 P.2d at 955.
187 CALLIES, supra note 1, at 41; MANDELKER, supra note 22, at S 6.36.
188 HONOLULU, HAW., CHARTER S 6-909 (1984). The mayor of the City and County
of Honolulu has, with the approval of the City Council, "reallocated" such power to
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The Lum Court has been sharply critical of the zoning variance
process as exercised by the zoning board of appeals (Z.B.A.). In
McPherson v. Zoning Board of Appeals,'8 9 the Z.B.A. granted a variance
to the owner of agriculturally-zoned land to enlarge a nonconforming
use of the premises for a piggery in a zone which prohibited such use
altogether.'19 The court reversed and remanded the decision of the
Z.B.A.' 9' principally because the Z.B.A. failed to make required find-
ings of fact to support the granting of the variance,' 92 as required by
the Charter, a common complaint about Z.B.A.s generally.' 3
The court noted that the Charter requires the showing of unnecessary
hardship upon a showing that the applicant would be otherwise deprived
of the reasonable use of land or building, that the request for the
variance is due to unique circumstances not common to the rest of the
neighborhood, and that the grant of the variance will not alter the
essential character of the locality nor be contrary to the intent and
purpose of the zoning ordinance. '94 Applying the requirements, the
court observed, first, that "the record however is devoid of any evidence
that the appellant could not make reasonable use of the land or buildings
in conformity with the AG-i (Restricted Agricultural district) zoning
or her preexisting nonconforming use."195
As to the uniqueness of appellant's circumstances, the court called
it questionable that the violation of the ordinance could, as the Z.B.A.
suggested, be a unique circumstance as a matter of law, and that "in
our view, the conclusion of law is not supported by the facts in the
record.'" 6 Finally, the court questioned whether, from the record, the
essential character of the neighborhood was altered by the vastly
increased numbers in the piggery and whether the zoning ordinance
intent was adversely affected by permitting by variance what was
grant variances to the Director of the Department of Land Utilization, under a general
charter provision granting him the power to reallocate functions among departments.
It is the position of the authors, however, that such reallocation power does not apply
to specific grants of power under the Charter. The matter is now under consideration
by the City Charter Revision Commission during its decennial deliberations.
18 67 Haw. 603, 699 P.2d 26 (1985) (Padgett, J.).
,90 Id. at 603, 699 P.2d at 26.
19, Id. at 607, 699 P.2d at 29.
192 Id.
,93 See, e.g., CALLIES & FREILICH, supra note 19, at ch. 2.
'94 67 Haw. at 605, 699 P.2d 28 (citing HONOLULU, HAW., CHARTER S 6-909 (1984)).
195 Id. at 606, 699 P.2d at 28.
196 Id.
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purposely excluded as a use in AG-1 and relegated to AG-2 (General
Agricultural district). 197 The Board was directed upon remand to hold
new hearings to permit the parties to introduce relevant evidence in
connection with the aforementioned charter criteria for granting vari-
ances. 
198
The case indirectly raises the issue of whether use variances are in
any set of circumstances appropriate, leaving the Z.B.A. only with the
power to vary the terms of a zoning ordinance to permit area or bulk
variances. What kind of evidence would justify a use contrary to that
permitted under a zone classification? Is there any land-use related
hardship that is comparable to or less damaging to the neighborhood
than, say, the varying of a front or side yard by a few inches or a
minimum lot area requirement by a few feet in order to permit
construction of an otherwise permitted use? The state of California
amended its statute in 1970 to virtually eliminate use variances largely
because of these problems.' 99
The court also has decided that the Z.B.A. has no authority to hear
building permit appeals, even if they deal tangentially with zoning
matters. In Swire Properties (Hawaii), Ltd. v. Zoning Board of Appeals,2°
the court ruled that the decision of the Honolulu Director of the
Department of Land Utilization that certain ridgeline property owners
were not protected by a view protection ordinance "must stand" since
the Z.B.A. lacked jurisdiction under the Charter for the City and
County of Honolulu to hear the appeal. 20 1 The Charter restricts the
Z.B.A.'s appeals to decisions of the Department of Land Utilization
(D.L.U.) Director in the administration of the zoning and subdivision
ordinances only. 20 2 The court's characterization of the facts also makes
it clear that the court was disenchanted with the Z.B.A. reversal of
the D.L.U. Director20 3 given that the Charter requires that the Z.B.A.
must first find that the Director acted in an arbitrary or capricious
197 Id.
198 Id. at 607, 699 P.2d at 29.
199 See Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 522 P.2d
12 n.5 (1974).
No.. 90-1212, slip op. (Haw. Feb. 27, 1992).
201 Id. at 7.
201 Id. at 4.
20 The Director of the Department of Land Utilization is responsible for the
administration of the Honolulu Land Use Ordinance (LUO) and the Subdivision
Code. HONOLULU, HAW., CHARTER S 6-909 (1984).
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manner, or had manifestly abused his discretion or had acted on an
erroneous finding of material fact.
204
In Foster Village Community Ass'n v. Hess,20 5 the I.C.A. faced a novel
question of whether a pig is a pet and thus permitted as an accessory
use206 and the question of whether a decision on that issue by the
Z.B.A. is a rule-making function. 207 Chun, the owner of the pig, was
informed by the Honolulu Building Department that she was in vio-
lation of the Comprehensive Zoning Code (CZC) and must get rid of
her pet.2° The D.L.U. decided that Chun was not in violation of the
CZC and did not seek a variance.20 9 The neighborhood board appealed
the decision and demanded a hearing in front of the Z.B.A.21" The
Z.B.A. affirmed the decision of the D.L.U. holding that the D.L.U.
had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in determining that the pig
was a pet. 21 ' The appellants appealed the decision arguing that the
D.L.U. and the Z.B.A. engaged in "rule-making. 2 1 2 However, the
court held that D.L.U. and the Z.B.A. were engaged in an adjudicative
function and not rule-making function. 213 Therefore the decision was
not invalid for failure of the agency to meet the procedural requirements
for performing its rule-making function within the meaning of HAPA. 214
The court noted the difficulty in distinguishing between the rule-making
and the adjudication functions, particularly where statutory language
is unclear. 21
In sum, the court has been critical of the activities of the zoning
board of appeals from a variety of perspectives. This is not unusual
for such citizen administrative bodies which are often confused con-
cerning their role and the strict legal standards under which they carry
out their functions. However, the alternative is giving the "relief valve"
204 HONOLULU, HAW., CHARTER S 6-909 (1973).
205 4 Haw. App. 463, 667 P.2d 850 (1983) (Heen J.), cert. denied, 66 Haw. 681
(1983)).
206 Id. at 464, 667 P.2d at 851.
207 Id.
Id. at 465, 667 P.2d at 851-52.
209 Id. at 466, 667 P.2d at 852.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 467, 667 P.2d at 853.
212 Id. at 473, 667 P.2d at 856.
213 Id. at 474-75, 667 P.2d at 857.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 475-76, 667 P.2d at 857.
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function contemplated by the drafters of the Standard Zoning Enabling
Act to a single administrator. This raises the problem of reconcentrating
zoning authority in the hands of executive agency administrators which
is not what the aforesaid drafters had in mind 216
VIII. . . . AND ALL THE REST BRIEFLY NOTED
In other unrelated (except for their land use impacts) cases, the Lum
Court has cut back from the United States Supreme Court definition
of public use for purposes of eminent domain, and addressed the
conflict between religious practices and land use controls. To these we
now briefly turn.
A. Land Use Controls* Take Precedence Over Religious Practices
The federal courts have always observed limits on the free exercise
of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment.2 17 The Lum Court
adheres to this limitation at the state court level when a religious
practice, as opposed to a religious belief, conflicts with a land use
law. 218 Acting per curiam in Marsland v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness,21 9 the court refused to permit the use of a church as a
dwelling where that use conflicted with applicable zoning regulations,
even though the owners could show that such group living was a part
of its religious practice. 220 In this case, the Krishnas used a residential
116 See Model Act and commentary in CALLIES & FREILICH, supra note 19, at ch. 1;
MANDELKER, supra note 22, 5 4.20.
217 See, e.g., Braunfield v. Braun, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (holding that a general state
law regulating conduct which indirectly burdens religious observance is constitutional
as long as the law is within the power of the state and advances the state's secular
goals). Based in part upon the philosophy in Braunfield, a federal circuit court has
upheld a local zoning ordinance which forbids the construction of churches in most
residential zones. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City
of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983).
"I8 Dedman v. Bd. of Land & Natural Resources, 69 Haw. 255, 740 P.2d 28 (1987)
(Lum, C.J.); Marsland v. Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, 66 Haw. 119, 657
P.2d 1035 (1983) (per curiam).
29 66 Haw. 119, 657 P.2d 1035 (1983) (per curiam).
220 Id. at 121-22, 657 P.2d at 1037-38.
The Richardson Court apparently did not have an opportunity to rule on the issue
of conflict between zoning and religious practices. However, in State v. Maxwell, 62
Haw. 556, 617 P.2d 816 (1980) (per curiam), which involved the criminal conviction
of appellant for operating a hula studio in a residential district, the court did note in
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structure as a church and as a dwelling for unrelated persons coming
to the temple to learn the Krishna lifestyle.221 The building, a two-
story structure originally designed for use as a single-family home, was
located in a single-family dwelling zoning district which, under the
then-applicable CZC regulations,2 22 prohibited more than five unrelated
people from occupying a dwelling.2 22 Apparently, there were thirty
members living on the premises. 24 The court held that when the
premises are used as a residence rather than as a church, then the
provisions of the CZC apply, in which case the Krishnas were in
violation. 225
The court, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Lum, similarly
upheld a geothermal project approval by the state Board of Land and
Natural Resources against a claim by Pele practitioners that the use
thus permitted would infringe on their religious practices. In Dedman
v. Board of Land & Natural Resources,226 Pele practitioners alleged that
both the granting of a permit to commence geothermal exploration and
the designation of a geothermal subzone by the Land Board infringed
upon their religious practices. 227 The court found that the Pele practi-
tioners failed to meet the heavy burden of showing that the actions of
the Board demonstrated a coercive effect upon them, as required in
such free exercise cases: "[A]pproval of the geothermal plant does not
regulate or directly burden Appellants' religious beliefs, nor inhibit
religious speech. Further, the Board's action does not compel them,
by threat of sanctions, to refrain from religiously motivated conduct
or engage in conduct they find objectionable on religious grounds. 228
The court further found that their religious practices were not burdened
dicta that "[tihe total exclusion of places of worship is regarded not only as a regulation
not within the scope of the police power, but also as one which infringes upon freedom
of religion guaranteed by the constitution." Id. at 561-62, 617 P.2d at 820. The court
did not rule on appellant's argument that hula lessons were an exercise of her religion,
nor on the constitutional question because, under the applicable zoning laws, "church
use" was a special use, and appellant had failed to apply for a special use permit,
rendering the issues not ripe for judicial review. Id.
221 Krishna Consciousness, 66 Haw. at 120, 657 P.2d at 1037.
222 Comprehensive Zoning Code S 21-110.
223 66 Haw. at 121, 657 P.2d at 1037-38.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 122, 617 P.2d at 1038.
226 69 Haw. 255, 740 P.2d 28 (1987) (Lum, C.J.).
227 Id. at 259, 740 P.2d at 31.
221 Id. at 261, 740 P.2d at 32 (footnotes omitted).
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by either the grant of the development permit or the reclassification of
land by the state.229
B. Land Reform and Eminent Domain
In perhaps the most important eminent domain case of the decade,
the United States Supreme Court decimated the public purpose clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution in Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff,230 which upheld Hawai'i's land reform
act. 23' The holding that the public purpose was whatever a legislature
could conceive it to be232 was all the more chilling because the United
States Supreme Court had nearly done away with the requirement of
absolute compensation for physical takings just two years earlier in the
case of Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter.23 3 Take away public purpose
and compensation and there is precious little left of the protections the
Fifth Amendment was designed to give for those whose property is
compulsorily acquired by government. Equally troublesome was the
Court's blind allegiance to Justice Douglas's equation of the public use
requirement in eminent domain with the state's police power, 234 a
mischief-prone joining of two unrelated concepts if there ever was one.
Fortunately, the Lum Court, in a unanimous opinion by Chief
Justice Lum, refused to follow that lead. In an otherwise identical
opinion to the Midkiff decision, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Lyman, 23 5
the Hawaii Supreme Court specifically declined
to embrace the Court's broader ruling in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff ... equating the public use requirement of eminent domain
with the state's police power. Rather, our review is limited to an
examination of the [land reform act's] constitutionality under the mini-
229 Id. at 262, 740 P.2d at 33. For detailed discussions of this case, see Jon M.
Van Dyke et al., The Protection of Individual Rights Under Hawai'i's Constitution, 14
U. HAW. L. REV. 311 (1992); Jeffrey S. Portnoy, The Lum Court and the First
Amendment, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 395 (1992); Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie, The
Lum Court and Native Hawaiian Rights, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 377 (1992) (all in this
issue).
2- 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
22 David L. Callies, A Requiem for Public Purpose: Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 1985 INSTITUTE FOR PLANNING ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN, ch. 8.
222 467 U.S. at 241.
222 458 U.S. 419 (1982). A substantial minority of the Court was willing to undertake
a balancing test to see if a physical invasion was sufficiently significant to warrant
compensation. 458 U.S. at 442 (Blacknun, J., dissenting).
224 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
222 68 Haw. 55, 704 P.2d 888 (1985) (Lum, C.J.).
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mum rationality standard, which we adopt as appropriate for judicial
evaluation of the legislature's public use determinations.
23 6
IX. CONCLUSION
The Lum Court has consistently ruled in the area of land use to
give effect to legislative intent. It has strictly construed the State Zoning
Enabling Act so as to carry out legislative intent that land use planning
and zoning be long range and comprehensive.2 37 In doing so, it has
stressed the importance of conformity of zoning ordinances to devel-
opment plans, 238 and has held that the use of initiative to rezone is
illegal because it does not further that particular legislative intent which
stresses the importance of land use planning in Hawai'i's regulatory
system. 239 The court has also strictly interpreted HAPA and the CZMA
to carry out legislative intent that legislative bodies be exempt from
their procedural requirements even though this has led to inconsistency
in application across the four counties. 240
The Lum Court has also consistently deferred to agency decisions,
which, according to the court, have a presumption of validity that is
difficult to overcome, even when the agency engages in procedural
irregularities.2 4' Given this presumption, environmental groups attempt-
ing to reverse agency decisions have been largely unsuccessful in
overturning agency decisions on procedural grounds, despite the court's
broad approach to giving such groups standing.2 2 In contrast, envi-
ronmental groups have been more successful in persuading legislative
bodies to change their planning and zoning decisions.
This is arguably as it should be. Courts are increasingly withdrawing
from a role in which they become second legislatures or executive
agencies and are increasingly suggesting that policy remedies belong
at another, usually legislative, level of government, where members
are elected by, and therefore directly accountable to, the people.
24 3
236 Id. at 69, 704 P.2d at 896-97.
211 See supra part II.
238 See supra part II.
2139 See supra part III.
I- See supra part IV.
241 See supra part VI.
242 See supra part V.
243 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(dealing with this subject in a slightly different but philosophically similar context).
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What this means for those with environmental concerns, or for any
person dealing with land use agencies, is that the bulk of work, e.g.,
lobbying, commenting, and adjudicating, should be concentrated at
the legislative and administrative levels. The Lum Court's decisions
indicate that the court will no longer be a legislature of last resort.

